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Professor Robert Abrams is a serious and successful scholar. He is also an
unusually nice and candid fellow, and he presents a workable, efficient, and
carefully crafted plan for producing legal scholarship. If you follow his
scheme, you will probably get tenure. This is the case even though it is now
painfully obvious that the law school boom has gone bust. Nevertheless, I
urge you to think about scholarship differently.
My reasons have to do with the connection between passion and produc-
tion values. My concerns are admittedly somewhat unusual, if not eccentric,
in the cool and rational world of legal academia. Moreover, the very notion
of giving advice to new law teachers suggests an uncomfortable degree of
egocentric holier-than-thouism. So I could easily trash myself and this
assignment, but I think I can be somewhat more constructive than that. In
fact, it is precisely the chilling effect of our overdeveloped critical faculties
which constitutes the present, clear danger I want to address. Without
passion, excessive production values may yield security-but in a job you do
not want. Abrams's advice does not necessarily exclude passion, and his own
scholarship demonstrates his passionate engagement. But Abrams's agenda
fails to address what I think is necessary, and what perhaps has to be suffi-
cient, if you are to make sense of your choice of legal scholarship over the
lucre, laudatory feedback, and perquisites of law practice.
If you studiously follow Abrams's prescription and place his agenda at the
core of your personal project-as today's cliche would have you refer to your
work-you may get tenure, but you might also lose sight of why you wanted
it in the first place. I do not doubt that getting tenure is preferable to the
alternative, nor do I challenge the importance of writing. Moreover, tenure
surely is tougher to get now than it was five years ago and it is getting
tougher all the time. Certainly the crunch has come to legal academe. This
may be because of demographics, a glut on the market for lawyerly labors,
scarcer resources, tightening of the tap that since the 1960s provided a pool of
previously excluded sources for more diverse student bodies, or possibly
other "unknown and perhaps unknowable factors."' Still, the coin of the
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I would like to dedicate this essay to Professor Thomas I. Emerson. He has taught me and
many others a great deal, not least through his example. He is a law teacher who is able to
become passionately engaged without raising his voice; his engagement has in no way dimin-
ished his great scholarly achievement.
I. This phrase comes from Justice Stewart's decisive concurring opinion in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974), which determined that a federal court could not
@ 1987 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 37 J. Legal Educ. 20 (1987).
Legal Scholarship
realm remains the production of what we are pleased to call legal scholar-
ship. Getting out scholarship continues to be the way to show the flag and to
do what is worth doing.
So I want to discuss writing. First, I urge you to take a romantic leap of
faith in yourself. Next, I describe why there may be no safety net as you
perform the giddy trapeze act of actually trying to be a legal scholar. Finally,
I will try to make a simple, perhaps even simple-minded, point about your
chosen profession.
Passion and Production
When you think of a topic to write about, I urge you to choose something
you care about deeply. Choose something about which you feel passionately.
I am guessing that all new law teachers have passionate beliefs, though this
may be despite rather than because of success in the training that helped us
land teaching jobs. Even more emphatically, I am asserting that all who, by
my lights, should be in teaching decide to teach not because it is a refuge and
not because it is easy. Rather, we have sufficient hubris to think that our own
thoughts are important enough to undertake the arduous task of trying to
communicate them to others.
By urging you to be passionate in your choice of subjects, I do not mean to
suggest for a moment that uncontrolled emoting will get you very far. Nor
am I hinting that by going eyeball-to-eyeball with the cosmos you will have
any more luck than the rest of us in convincing a muse to grace your type-
writer or word processor. On the contrary, writing is very hard work. As
Ibsen put it,
To live is to battle with trolls
in the vaults of the heart and the brain.
To write: that is to sit
in judgement over one's self.
It is precisely because writing is so gut-wrenchingly difficult that I believe
it vital to choose to write about something you care about deeply. Then your
commitment to your subject will help to sustain you through this struggle.
impose interdistrict remedies for school segregation without proof of interdistrict constitu-
tional violations. Despite the State of Michigan's ongoing participation in the schools in
Detroit and surrounding towns, neither Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion nor Justice
Stewart's concurrence could discern sufficient connections to merit upholding the interdis-
trict remedy that the district court and court of appeals found necessary to prevent Detroit's
schools from becoming virtually all black.
It is not obvious, to put it mildly, why the presence of "unknown and perhaps unknowable
factors" should militate against the constitutional claims of minority students rather than
against the brokers of the powers that be. Perhaps law schools will not follow the Court in
deciding that if there is a basic problem whose causes are not entirely clear, the response
should be to do nothing. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II)
(upholding expenditure of state funds for remedial education to return victims of unconsti-
tutional action to position they would have enjoyed but for the violation).
2. Henrik Ibsen is quoted in Robertson Davies, The Manticore 73 (New York, 1984).
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Law professors may have an even tougher time than most actually getting
words on paper because we are so keenly attuned to spotting errors and to
countering arguments. We, who learned to squeeze our skepticisms into blue
books and out of clerkship memoranda, now find our corrosive intellectual
skills turned upon ourselves. Therefore, it becomes crucially important to
write about what you genuinely believe rather than to write about what you
are told or come to understand from others you ought to address.
Testing one's own passionate beliefs in the process of trying to commit
them to paper is a marvelous way to grow. To put passions through this
crucible repeatedly gives us hope that we can develop as writers; such testing
also nurtures us as teachers, colleagues, and perhaps even as thinkers. If we
succeed, we become passionate thinkers. We might even become law profes-
sors whose hearts and minds are not divided and whose professions merit
attention. Moreover, the struggle to communicate our commitments tends to
remind us of what we valued before we undertook to think like lawyers.
Continuing to have friends and relations outside law, and to share thoughts,
drafts, and passions with them clarifies what matters as they challenge us to
communicate plainly and persuasively.
In The Manticore, the most introspective if least successful novel in
Robertson Davies's marvelous Deptford trilogy, the lawyer who is under-
going Jungian analysis remembers what his old teacher Dunstan Ramsay
("Old Buggerlugs") used to say. Ramsay, who wrote curious books about
saints yet preached the Plain Style in writing, insisted, "Be sure you choose
what you believe and know why you believe it, because if you don't choose
your beliefs, you may be certain that some belief, and probably not a very
creditable one, will choose you." 3
Throughout Davies's wonderful work and, I would bet, at or near the core
of whatever you consider to be the best novel you have recently read is the
struggle to combine, mediate, or otherwise resolve the relationship between
reason and passion. The same is probably true of whatever legal writing you
consider the best you know. (While it may not be surprising if you cannot
recall a favorite novel or great legal writing, either omission might suggest
that you should rethink your career choice.) In both literary forms the trick,
the challenge, and what is probably the unattainable goal is the same: to
master the minutiae without losing the ability to soar. What makes the task
so hard-in fact, so seemingly impossible-is the inevitable gap between
what we imagine we can commlunicate and what emerges, even after
struggle, on the page.
Politics and Production Values
All writers must also consider the problem of audience, of course, unless
they believe the knowledge that comes from the suffering it takes to create is
3. Id. at 230. This theme is central throughout Davies's writing. It seems often to be the key to
his explanation of what makes someone great, for example, "flashes of insight, when he
pierces through the nonsense of his time, and gets at something that really matters."
Robertson Davies, Tempest-Tost 181 (New York, 1985).
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itself adequate reward. Hypothetical ascetics satisfied with complete subjec-
tivism may write on their cave walls somewhere, but such rarities are
unlikely to have survived the LSATs. Indeed, the problem of audience is an
unusually burdensome concern in our somewhat narrow and linear corner
of the world. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that many law profes-
sors still seek to influence the way lawyers, judges, legislators, bureaucrats,
and even the general public think about the law. The cruel reality is that
hardly anyone reads law review articles. Nevertheless, we scan tables of
contents and resumes and we make judgments about candidates (and
colleagues) which are based largely on decisions made by students with two
years of legal education about what is fashionable or worthy. Too often,
finding out where an article appears is the end of our evaluation of it.
Those of us who actually scan articles become adept at choosing epithets
from the Chinese menu of devastating pejoratives that experienced law
professors keep near at hand. An article is readily dismissed as "insufficiently
normative" if it merely discovers something about the world; it is "overly
idealistic" if it involves normative discourse. Similarly, discussion of
doctrine can be perceived as typical and too narrow but, if a piece lacks
doctrine-crunching, it may be denounced as either too abstract or insuffi-
ciently legal.
Many of us seem so determined to impose our own particular values on an
indeterminate world that, without reflecting or noticing the reflections, we
merrily roll along labeling most articles "totally worthless," and lambasting
the scholarship that is left as "second-rate," "a minor contribution,"
"perhaps a single, but certainly not a home run," or "merely workmanlike."
We would not know a "breakthrough" if we tripped over it. Yet law profes-
sors seldom confront the issue of what criteria we apply. If we did, we might
discover the abyss of uncertainty. We then would be less able to congratulate
ourselves on the way we wield power and principle.
Today most Americans apparently seek to return to the gilded age of
yesteryear, to the time Douglass Adair aptly described as dominated by
"pocket-slapping complacency." '4 Not surprisingly, the news from the law-
teaching guild is not terribly different. Our Zeitgeist includes a disturbing
amount of "looking out for numero uno," combined with a remarkable lack
of tolerance for those who have chosen slightly different career paths or other
political values. Too many people seem to enter the law-teaching racket not
merely because it does not require heavy lifting but because it seems the next
logical step on some competitive escalator. It seems that now many find it
much easier, much more acceptable, to show willingness as well as ability to
destroy anything or anyone who dares try to enter the law school ranks.
Today it is becoming increasingly important to be regarded as someone
with standards, sufficiently tough-minded to make principled decisions
involving fixed or even shrinking resources. Bluster about the necessity for
4. The statement is from Douglass Adair's essay, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," reprinted
in Trevort Colbourn, ed., Fame and the Founding Fathers 83 (Williamsburg, VA., 1974).
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razor-sharp lines is rewarded; quickness in condemning inadequacy is the
macho way for both women and men to gain respect and to win promotions.
The current paradigm, unlike that of a century ago, may be based more on
economics than on geometry and biology, but we are again embarked upon a
set of intellectual journeys in which most thinkers seem to "relish a ruthless
theory." 5 We are increasingly prone to commit the error once described as
mistaking the detachment of the undertaker for the detachment of the
surgeon.
Recently, there have been too many poignant incidents in which tenure
was denied to scholars whose career paths were out of the ordinary, or whose
writing did not fit comfortably within established patterns. For example,
within the past few years several leading law schools declared policies of
considerable liberality in granting parental leaves. Then, professing regret,
these same schools factored lack of production (as it were) into decisions that
outstanding publication and teaching records were inadequate to grant
tenure to extraordinarily capable women. Additionally, the bitter opposition
at some schools to those associated with Critical Legal Studies is now a
matter of quite public record. Similar but less open fear and loathing of a
wide range of beliefs at many institutions is masked by a process that
purports to apply objective criteria.
Risking Toleration
When I urge you to follow your nose in deciding what you want to write
about, therefore, I am suggesting that you take a risky course. You may
regret it. But I have a hunch that if you play it safe, you will find that even
the significant achievement of tenure may turn out to be another Pyrrhic
victory in the long line of empty successes our skepticism teaches us to
recognize. In academia, as in politics, there may be no ends, just means.
If you choose what you believe for yourself and have the courage to
examine and to argue for that belief, you may do great scholarly work.
Rather than waiting for the chance to work from within, an approach that is
always risky and often fatal for one's ideals, you might actually find that you
are strong enough to appear tolerant and brave enough to resist the impulse
to apply standard standards. Then, as you gain the respect of the colleagues
whose opinions you truly value, you will be asked to judge others. You will
find yourself in a position to be both tough and tolerant about scholarship
and, most significantly, about your own efforts.
In a sense, of course, I am preaching an old, timeworn, and perhaps
threadbare idea. I hope it rises above the level of Frank Sinatra doing it his
way. I would prefer to link it to Roger Williams. As portrayed in a brilliant,
brief biography by Edmund Morgan,6 Williams became increasingly
5. This lament about the Gilded Age by Charles Peirce is quoted in an excellent essay about
Peirce in R. Jackson Wilson, In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United
States, 1860-1920 56 (New York, 1967).
6. See generally, Edmund Morgan, Roger Williams: The Church and the State (New York,
1967). 1
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orthodox until he literally found no one sufficiently pure to worship with
except his wife-and he was not so sure about her. It was at that point,
convinced that the earth was a dunghill, that this innovative American
thinker determined to explore the frontier of religious toleration. Through
his courage "to go where the mind leads," Roger Williams achieved limited
yet exceptional greatness. At the end of his biography of Williams, Morgan
says of Williams, "He dared to think." 7 Those of us who have chosen to be
law teachers have the resources and the marvelous opportunity to follow that
example: we might even transform skepticism into toleration.
I would like to close with the words of Shakespeare in The Tempest. For
years, I have used The Tempest to begin my American Legal History course
for a number of reasons. In fact, I find new reasons each time I teach it. Of
particular relevance to the topic at hand, however, is Prospero's closing
speech. As you probably recall, Prospero decides at the end of the play to
renounce his magic power and to abandon the mystical island he rules. In
the Epilogue, undoubtedly seeking applause, Prospero says:
Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
And what strength I have's mine own,
Which is most faint.
Prospero continues with what I take to be a deeper plea:
Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
And my ending is despair,
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so, that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardon'd be,
Let your indulgence set me free.
Prospero and old Shakespeare were seeking more than applause. So should
we.
7. Id. at 142.
